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Executive Summary
Potential food safety hazards include foodborne 
pathogens,1 use of antibiotics leading to resistant 
bacteria, chemical residuals in food products, medi­
cine residues, growth hormones, and genetically 
modified organisms. The relative importance that 
consumers [and public authorities] place on each 
individual food safety issue varies noticeably across 
countries.2 From an economic viewpoint, however, 
the common feature shared by these issues is that 
policy intervention to address them might improve 
social welfare. Two main arguments support the 
contention that public intervention is welfare 
improving: [1] insufficient information about the 
safety of different products prevents consumers 
from having a proper choice, and [2] food safety is 
not entirely a private matter because public expen­
ditures on, for instance, public health costs and 
sick pay are linked directly to each case of human 
disease. Hence, public authorities have a direct eco­
nomic interest in implementing optimal food safety 
policies.
Salmonella is a bacterial foodborne pathogen that 
causes human illness of varying severity, from mild 
cases to death. Salmonella control in the Nordic 
countries is considered leading-edge by inter­
national standards [Wahlstrom 2006; Wegener et 
al. 2003], In the late 1980s the Danish government, 
together with the industries concerned, formulated 
Salmonella control programs as a reaction to a sub­
stantial increase in the number of human cases of 
illness due to Salmonella. The policy succeeded in 
reducing the number of human cases of illness due 
to Salmonella in Danish-produced meat and eggs. 
The policy levied extra costs on food producers 
and the public sector, but economic analyses sug­
gest that there are net benefits to society in the 
longer run owing to economic benefits from 
improved public health.
The international environment has created a chal­
lenge for Denmark's formulation of future food 
safety policies. Denmark has experienced a large 
increase in the volume of imported meat products
1 Apart from bacteria, foodborne pathogens also include 
parasites, viruses, and prions.
2 For example, genetically modified organisms and
growth hormones are widely accepted in the United
States but are considered food safety problems by con­
sumers and public authorities in Europe.
in recent years, and the prevalence of Salmonella [as 
well as other bacteria, especially Campylobacter] in 
imported meat is significantly higher than in 
Danish-produced meat. As a basic rule, European 
Union [EU] legislation does not permit countries 
[except Finland and Sweden] to ban imported meat 
on the basis of prevalence of bacteria. Recent 
documentation of large variations in infection levels 
in products from different countries [Danish 
Veterinary and Food Administration 2006], how­
ever, has made the EU more inclined to allow 
country-specific rules regarding food safety. In 
addition, the EU implemented new criteria for 
hygiene and food safety processes in January 2006 
to increase food safety in Europe.
Your assignment is to identify opportunities and 
obstacles for improving Danish food safety policy 
using Salmonella control as a case. Discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of the options men­
tioned in this case study for each stakeholder 
group. The assignment should include a discussion 
of the consequences of increased food safety in 
rich countries for the trading opportunities of 
developing countries. For example, is there neces­
sarily a trade-off between the best possible food 
safety in Denmark and the welfare of people in 
developing countries that wish to export food 
products to Denmark?
Background
Food Safety
Food consumption has always been a matter of 
keen interest and concern. Historically, concern has 
focused on securing sufficient intake of food to 
avoid malnutrition and starvation. Food risk was 
associated with lack of food, as is still the case in 
many parts of the world. In industrial countries, 
however, the focus on food consumption has 
changed dramatically and now centers on how to 
limit the intake of food in order to avoid obesity3 *
while at the same time securing a safe, nutritious, 
and tasty diet. Food safety in industrial countries 
today is concerned with guaranteeing that the risk 
levels from hazards like microbiological bacteria 
[such as Salmonella and Campylobacter], natural
3 This concern also extends to obesity-related risk of 
illness.
toxins, chemicals, and medical residuals in food 
products are sufficiently low. For some consumers, 
absence of genetically modified organisms, growth 
hormones, and radiation are also important 
attributes for their perceptions of food safety (see, 
for example, Andersen and Christensen 2004).
Salmonella in Denmark
Salmonella was the main source of zoonotic infec­
tions in Denmark in the 1980s and 1990s. From 
1980 to 1997, the number of registered human 
cases of illness due to Salmonella infection rose 
fivefold in Denmark, reaching 5,015 (Ministry of 
Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries 1998). Moreover, 
many infections occur without physician consulta­
tion or hospitalization and are therefore not regis­
tered. It is estimated that only between 5 and 20 
percent of the total number of human infections 
are registered (Korsgaard et al. 2005). This estimate 
implies that the actual number of Salmonella infec­
tions in Denmark was likely between 25,000 and 
100,000 human cases in 1997—in other words, 
between 0.5 and 2 percent of the population had a 
Salmonella infection.4 Moreover, there is a small 
increased risk of mortality shortly after hospitaliza­
tion, as a direct or indirect result of Salmonella 
infection. Based on a study by Helms et al. (2003), 
for most types of Salmonella, the excess mortality 
rate during the first year after infection is esti­
mated to be 2 percent of the registered number of 
cases. Thus it is estimated that 100 Danes died 
prematurely in 1997 as a consequence of Salmonella 
infection.
The increase in Salmonella infections led the Danish 
government, together with the industries con­
cerned, to formulate a new food safety policy to 
reduce the number of human cases of illness due to 
Salmonella in pork, poultry, eggs, and beef. In 1992 
the first public Salmonella program was imple­
mented to control Salmonella in broiler and egg 
production. In 1994 a public Salmonella control 
program for pig and pork production was imple­
mented; in 1996 an intensified program to control 
Salmonella in broilers and eggs was implemented
4 The uncertainty of estimates of the actual number of 
cases is also illustrated in Ryan et al. (1987). in 1985 the 
United States had a Salmonella outbreak with 16,000 
culture-confirmed cases; 2 0 0 ,0 0 0  additional sympto­
matic cases were found in a door-to-door survey of con­
sumers, and 2 percent of those were found to have new 
arthritis symptoms after the outbreak.
(the program for eggs did not take effect until 
1998). Since 2002 cattle and beef production have 
been regulated.
Current Danish Salmonella control programs 
involve several policy instruments. The programs 
prescribe surveillance in all parts of the production 
chain through tests of meat juice, blood, pen fecal 
samples, and eggs, as well as increased hygiene 
requirements. When Salmonella is discovered in a 
poultry flock, the animals are slaughtered sepa­
rately from noninfected flocks, infected breeding 
flocks are destroyed, and eggs from infected flocks 
are pasteurized. Pigs from herds with high levels of 
Salmonella are slaughtered under special hygiene 
conditions, and slaughterhouses reduce the pay­
ments for pigs delivered from these farms (Minis­
try of Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries 2006; 
Wegener et al. 2003). In Denmark, there is zero 
tolerence for a specific type of Salmonella called 
MRDT104 in all food.
The Salmonella control programs have succeeded in 
reducing the number of human cases of illness due 
to Salmonella. The number of registered human 
Salmonella infections fell from 4,276 cases in 1994 
to 1,775 cases in 2005 (Figure 1). It is estimated that 
the actual number of human cases of illness has 
been reduced by between 150,000 and 600 ,000  
since 1994.5 In addition, approximately 600 pre­
mature deaths may have been avoided during that 
period.6
5 it is assumed that, in the absence of the programs, the 
annual number of human cases of illness would stay at 
the level observed the year before implementation of the 
program. Accordingly, since the first Salmonella control 
program for pork was fully implemented in 1994, the 
annual number of cases in the absence of the pork 
program is assumed to be the same as in 1993. Likewise, 
since the extended public control of Salmonella in broiler 
and egg production became effective in 1996 and 1998, 
respectively, the annual number of cases in the absence 
of the poultry program is assumed to be the same as in 
1995 with respect to broilers and in 1997 with respect to 
eggs. The interval end points (150,000 and 600 ,000) are 
the estimated reduction in the actual number of human 
cases of illness, for the period 1994-2005, based on 
registration rates between 5 and 20 percent.
6 The number of registered human cases of illness 
avoided due to Salmonella control was estimated to be 
30,800 (see footnote 5). Assuming an excess mortality 
rate of 2 percent for all registered cases, an estimated 616 
premature deaths were avoided.
Fig u re  1: A n n u a l N u m b er o f  Hum an Cases o f  Illn e ss due to  Salm onella R eg istered  in  D enm ark, 1994— 
2 0 0 5
Source: Statens Serum Institut [www.ssi.dk].
It is not costless to ensure safer food products. 
The Salmonella control programs have generated 
substantial costs for Danish pork, poultry, and egg 
producers, slaughterhouses, and egg-packaging 
units. Also, the public sector has incurred moni­
toring, control, and administration costs. The 
direct costs during the period 1995-2002 have 
been estimated at approximately US$235 million 
[Andersen and Christensen 2006],
The main benefit arising from increased food safety 
is improved public health. The most visible direct 
economic benefits are reductions in health expendi­
tures [for hospitals and doctors] and increased 
workforce productivity arising from fewer sick 
days. The benefits of increased food safety also 
include the utility of better health that comes with 
avoiding the discomfort of being ill and the risk of 
dying prematurely. Furthermore, there is a poten­
tial utility gain associated with the increased trust in 
food products in general that may arise from a 
strict Salmonella control program. Moreover, 
research and development for Salmonella control 
may produce improved technologies that can be
used to reduce other food hazards or that prove to 
be cost saving.
A reasonable policy question is whether the direct 
costs of US$235 million have been a good invest­
ment of money from society's point of view. In 
other words, has the improvement in public health 
elicited economic benefits that match the costs? A 
number of studies have investigated this question; 
see, for example, Hansen [2002], Korsgaard et al. 
[2005], and Andersen and Christensen [2006], 
Andersen and Christensen [2006] compare direct 
costs with direct benefits in terms of reduced 
public health expenditures and increased workforce 
productivity. The study suggests that for the 
period 1995-2002, the Salmonella control pro­
grams have generated net direct costs to society. 
This conclusion is based on the assumption that 
producers, consumers, and other economic agents 
do not react to the change in policy. To challenge 
that approach, the authors perform a general 
equilibrium analysis that allows a longer time hori­
zon, behavioral adjustments, and interactions and 
feedback mechanisms between agents. Hence, the 
analysis includes both direct and derived effects
elicited by adjustments in agents' behavior. The 
general equilibrium analysis shows that the derived 
effects in terms of changes in production activities 
and consumption patterns are positive, resulting in 
a slight increase in real gross domestic product 
[GDP], In all the studies mentioned, the economic 
benefits are known to be underestimated because 
the analyses do not include the benefits of a reduc­
tion in the number of long-term complications and 
premature deaths. Nor do they include the benefits 
of consumers' increased utility due to reduced 
discomfort from being ill.
In conclusion, even though the analyses did not 
include all benefits, the Danish Salmonella control 
policy was found to have a positive impact on real 
GDP and thus to be profitable from society's point 
of view. This result is driven by distributional 
effects such that Salmonella control is actually 
beneficial to some industries while posing net costs 
to other industries. Whether the Salmonella control 
programs are welfare increasing is a different ques­
tion, which the general equilibrium analysis does 
not answer [Golan et al. 2000],
The E U 's Food  Safety  Policy
The EU requires member states to monitor and 
control Salmonella and other foodborne zoonotic 
agents (Directive 2003/99 and Regulation 
2160/2003). Member states are required to design 
national control programs to reach common EU 
goals regarding the prevalence of Salmonella in 
primary production. No sanctions are specified, 
however, if a member state does not reach the 
goals.
The extent of control varies across member states. 
Finland and Sweden have had Salmonella control 
programs since the 1960s. In their zero-tolerance 
approach, all infected poultry flocks must be 
destroyed or slaughtered immediately after detec­
tion, and food found contaminated with Salmonella 
must be withdrawn from the market (Wahlstrom 
2006). Other countries have not implemented con­
trol programs yet. This difference implies that the 
prevalence of Salmonella in food products varies 
considerably across countries. A baseline study 
reveals that 80 percent of Portuguese and Polish 
egg-laying hen flocks were infected with Salmonella, 
compared with less than 3 percent in Denmark, 
Finland, and Sweden (Danish Veterinary and Food 
Administration 2006).
In January 2006 a revision of the EU's legislation 
on the hygiene of foodstuffs was implemented 
[Regulation 2073/2005). The regulation sets 
microbiological limits regarding Salmonella on car­
casses, and if the limits are exceeded, the responsi­
ble slaughterhouse and primary producer are 
required to change procedures (the so-called 
process hygiene criterion). In general, there are no 
restrictions on marketing infected products. The 
regulation includes zero tolerance, however, with 
regard to Salmonella in minced meats and certain 
other fresh meat products [the so-called food 
safety criterion). By the end of 2009 and 2010, 
respectively, all eggs and fresh poultry must also be 
free of Salmonella. If this criterion is not satisfied, 
then the product must be withdrawn from the 
market. The economic consequences of complying 
with these rules, as well as the implementation 
plans, are not clear at present.
Policy Issues
Why Intervene?
Why is it necessary to implement Salmonella con­
trol programs? Understanding the rationale for 
intervention is key to understanding how the 
policy should be implemented.
From an economic viewpoint, food safety is con­
sidered a commodity. Thus consumers' demand for 
food safety and producers' supply of food safety 
determine the market prices of different food 
safety levels—provided that the markets satisfy 
certain efficiency requirements. These requirements 
include, among other things, that no individual firm 
exercises market power, that there is a sufficient 
number of market participants, that there is full 
information about the products, and that there are 
no regulatory distortions. In such a setting, the 
market price equals the marginal value of the good 
(Russell and Wilkinson 1979).
For some well-defined standard versions of prod­
ucts (such as milk, butter, and some meat 
products), the price determines the market-clearing 
quantity. Other commodities, such as food safety, 
are more complex. Food safety is not traded as an 
individual good—the consumer cannot buy a bag 
of food safety. (Exceptions include chicken labeled 
"Salmonella free" or "Salmonella and Campylobacter 
free" and pasteurized eggs labeled "Salmonella free." 
These food products are almost exclusively
distinguished from other products through their 
food safety level.] An important reason why food 
safety attributes, such as the absence of Salmonella 
bacteria, are not traded is that they comprise 
credence characteristics, meaning that their value 
cannot be discerned even after consumption 
[Roberts 2005],
The pricing of food safety is subject to informa­
tional problems in terms of general uncertainty 
[which exists when neither producers, consumers, 
experts, nor public authorities know the exact value 
of the attribute] and asymmetric information 
[which exists when one party, typically the pro­
ducer, has superior information about the value of 
the attribute and has the economic incentive to use 
this information for private profit]. From an eco­
nomic point of view, there is a potential welfare 
improvement in creating an informationally effi­
cient market. In other words, if consumers are 
willing to pay more for specific attributes, there 
may be a social value associated with providing reli­
able and independent information. Instead of 
allowing only safe products on the market, it might 
be economically efficient to give consumers a 
choice among different levels of risk at different 
prices [Beales et al. 1981], Thus, providing extra 
information and ensuring well-informed freedom of 
choice is a very neutral public intervention strategy 
that represents a potential welfare gain.
If a market is very small, as is the case with 
Salmonella-free products in Denmark, then non­
economic factors like availability, shelf placement, 
and knowledge of the existence of the food prod­
uct can dominate the pure price mechanisms such 
that market values are not reliable indicators of the 
demand for these products.
In relation to food safety, there is an additional 
argument for public intervention. The health risk 
related to food consumption is an unintended side 
effect of consumption (which is often denoted as a 
negative externality]. Owing to the existence of 
public health insurance and labor market insurance 
in Denmark and other countries, food risks also 
imply negative externalities for public authorities 
and employers. Human infections due to food- 
borne diseases may impose direct costs to society 
arising from doctor and hospital expenses and lost 
workforce productivity. In addition, food risks are 
associated with indirect costs related to the per­
sonal discomfort of illness and general mistrust in
food, which might have an economic impact by 
increasing people's willingness to pay for safe food.
Hence, public authorities have a direct economic 
interest in defining an optimal food safety policy, 
and such a policy may generate positive indirect 
effects on consumers' utility. According to eco­
nomic theory, the policy options for public inter­
vention include [1] providing information to secure 
an informationally efficient market, [2] internalizing 
externalities through taxes or subsidies—an effi­
cient way of improving social economic welfare, 
and [3] in cases of extreme uncertainty about 
potential severe health impacts, banning certain 
goods and production procedures.
Social versus Private Perspective
The imperfections in the market for food safety 
create differences between public and private per­
ceptions of food safety. The aim of public inter­
ventions is to unite these perceptions.
Table 1 categorizes the costs and benefits of food 
safety according to whether they are included in 
decision making at the industry level, the consumer 
level, or the social welfare level. Public monitoring 
and control costs, public research and development 
expenditures, and public health costs are not 
included in a consumer- or industry-level analysis 
but are highly relevant in a social welfare analysis. 
Increased productivity has both private and social 
benefits, although the benefits differ. For society, 
increased productivity in any sector enhances 
welfare. For industry, on the other hand, increased 
productivity in its own sector is a positive change 
whereas increased productivity in a competing 
sector is considered a negative development. The 
increased utility of a safer product and increased 
trust in a regulated product are valuable to indus­
try since these benefits may help increase market 
shares and even consumers' willingness to pay for 
the product. For example, the fast-food chain Jack 
in the Box has embraced food safety innovation 
and management as a marketing tool (Theno 2006], 
From a social welfare perspective, a particular food 
safety policy might create additional positive effects 
in terms of increased trust in domestic products in 
general (which might improve exports and reduce 
imports]. Finally, changed market conditions and 
new technology are included in private as well as 
social analyses, but the weight and perceptions of 
these changes are likely to differ. Regulatory
programs can create the economic incentives for 
innovative ways to control foodborne pathogens.
Policy Issues Related to the EU
A particular problem related to Salmonella in 
Denmark is that Danish and imported meat prod­
ucts differ greatly in terms of Salmonella preva­
lence. Consumers, however, cannot distinguish
between commodities because differences in food 
safety levels or place of origin are often not visible 
[or are not made visible through compulsory 
labeling). Table 2 shows documented differences in 
zoonotic risks between domestic and imported 
products for pork, poultry, and eggs.
T ib le  1: C o sts and B enefits o f  Fo o d  Safety In clu d e d  in  D ecision  M aking a t Consum er, In d u stry , and  
So cia l W elfare Levels
Effect
C o n su m e r
level
In d u stry
level
Socia l w elfare  
level
Costs Industry costs of producing food safety No Yes Yes
Direct costs for the public sector (monitoring 
and control)
No No Yes
Indirect cost of research and development No Partly Yes
Benefits Reduced hospital expenses3 No No Yes
Improved productivity in all sectors No Partly Yes
Utility of better health3 Yes Partly Yes
Utility of increased trust in domestic food 
products
Yes Partly Yes
New technology as a result of research and 
development
No Partly Yes
Other
effects
Changing market conditions for all sectors No Partly Yes
3 Reduced hospital expenses and utility of better health are due to fewer cases of acute and lifelong chronic complications 
and fewer deaths.
Table 2 : Z o o n o tic R isks in  D anish and Im p o rted  P o rk, C h icken , and E g g  P ro d u cts
Z o o n o tic  risk P ro d u ct Im p o rt
Salmonella Pork Higher prevalence of Salmonella in imported pork
Campylobacter
Chicken
Eggs
Pork
Higher prevalence of Salmonella in imported chicken products 
Higher prevalence of Salmonella in imported eggs 
No documented differences
Resistant bacteria
Chicken
Eggs
Higher prevalence of Campylobacter in imported chicken products 
Campylobacter cannot survive in eggs and hence causes no problems in eggs 
More resistant bacteria in imported meats
The Danish Salmonella control programs regulate 
only domestic production of meats and eggs. 
Hence, the effectiveness of the policy in securing 
food safety in Denmark depends on the import 
volume of food products and consumption during 
travel. The substantial increase in imports in recent 
years (meat imports rose by two-thirds from 2002 
to 2005] causes a new food safety problem in 
Denmark—one that cannot be solved through the 
national Salmonella control programs. Further 
improvements in food safety in Denmark are highly 
dependent on international food safety policies in 
general and on European food safety policy in 
particular.
Because of their zero-tolerance policy, Finland and 
Sweden have a special agreement with the EU that 
allows them to ban imports of Salmonella-infected 
products. At first sight, it is neither legally possible 
nor economically attractive for Denmark to pursue 
this line. Legally, the EU has been very reluctant to 
allow other member countries to implement the 
same rules as Finland and Sweden. And according 
to economic theory, such zero tolerance is an 
extreme solution that is seldom economically effi­
cient because complete elimination of risk is often 
marginally very expensive. Nevertheless, the eco­
nomic considerations must be seen in a broader 
context given that a large part of the Danish 
Salmonella problem arises from imported products. 
Furthermore, after findings of very large differ­
ences in Salmonella prevalence across countries 
(Danish Veterinary and Food Administration 2006, 
Appendix 7], the EU has become more inclined to 
allow other countries to implement a zero-tolerance 
rule. For the near future, Danish food safety policy 
centers on pursuing EU acceptance for introducing 
an import ban on Salmonella-infected eggs and 
poultry products backed up by zero tolerance of 
Salmonella in domestic production. This solution 
might be economically sound, but it is governed by 
pressure from the public and the media rather than 
by direct economic assessment.
Global Aspects of Food Safety
Most traditional trade barriers, in terms of import 
tariffs and export subsidies, have been removed 
through multilateral agreements in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO], At the same time, non­
tariff or technical trade barriers are increasingly 
being used in, for example, food safety issues. Even 
though the objective of a policy is to improve food 
safety, it may restrict the international trade of
food products. The WTO agreement on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement] 
sets out the basic rules for trade restrictions based 
on food safety standards with the aim of avoiding 
protectionism in the guise of food safety. The 
agreement allows countries to set their own 
standards but says that regulations must be based 
on sound scientific arguments. In addition, food 
safety requirements must apply to domestic food 
products as well as imported food.
Food safety requirements may cause particular 
problems to developing countries for two reasons. 
First, requirements often call for the use of new 
inputs or technologies in the production process, 
and since developing countries have limited access 
to technical know-how, these requirements may 
restrict their trading opportunities. Second, food 
safety requirements involve costs of certification 
and control, and in developing countries private 
and public sector entities that certify and control 
conformity are underdeveloped (Jensen 2002], 
Hence, by serving as trade barriers, even if uninten­
tionally, food safety requirements in the rich coun­
tries may have negative consequences for living 
standards in developing countries. In other words, 
higher welfare through improved public health in 
rich countries may be associated with a loss of 
welfare in the poor countries owing to limited 
trading opportunities.
For example, the World Bank has studied the EU's 
regulation of aflatoxins in food products imported 
from Africa (Otsuki et al. 2001], "Aflatoxins" is a 
common name for a range of natural poisons that 
can infect nuts and dry fruits. In I960 it was found 
that aflatoxins in food could increase the risk of 
liver cancer. The health risk of aflatoxins is inter­
nationally recognized but assumed to be very small. 
When the EU harmonized the standards of member 
countries, it decided on a very restrictive risk level 
of aflatoxins (2 parts per million for the variant Bl; 
Regulation 1881/2006] compared with international 
standards (9 parts per million], Otsuki et al. (2001] 
estimated how this restrictive standard (compared 
with the international standard] affects international 
trade and health risks. They found that, each year, 
the EU's restrictive standard costs Africa US$670 
million in lost exports while it reduces the number 
of premature deaths due to liver cancer in the EU 
by 1.1 per year. This result must be compared with 
the WHO's estimate of 33,000 premature deaths 
due to liver cancer in general per year in a popula­
tion of about half a billion people, as in the EU.
Stakeholders
Regulation of the agricultural sector in Denmark 
has typically been based on heavy participation 
from industry, public authorities, and researchers.7 
This participation increases the incentives for com­
mitment, but also decreases the possibilities of 
ambitious goals. The economic impacts on social 
welfare or cost-effectiveness of policy measures 
have typically not been part of the discussions. 
Historically, Danish food safety policy has only 
been subject to ex post evaluation. In this respect, 
Danish food safety policy falls behind Danish envi­
ronmental policy, as well as food safety policy in 
other countries like the United States, where all 
regulations that are likely to have an impact of at 
least US$100 million must undergo a cost-benefit 
analysis [Antle 1999], Nonetheless, Salmonella con­
trol in the Nordic countries is considered leading- 
edge by international standards.
Consumers' interest in food safety is indicated by 
their demand [their willingness to pay for food 
safety). Food safety is a complex issue for the con­
sumer because it covers a diverse range of risks 
[including pesticides in cereals, fruits, and vegeta­
bles; bacteria in meats and eggs; medicine residues 
in meat; avian flu; and bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy [BSE]). In addition, food safety is 
only one of many product qualities, and consumers 
face a trade-off between the price of a food prod­
uct, its food safety attributes, and other quality 
attributes. Yet consumers can express interest in 
food safety only if they have access to food safety 
information on different products—and this is 
often a problem. The demand for one type of food 
safety might indeed be affected by information 
about other food safety issues. For example, the 
death of two people in Denmark in 2002 due to 
consumption of Salmonella-infected eggs in an 
uncooked cake caused a permanent increase in the 
consumption of pasteurized eggs in Denmark [Smed 
and Jensen 2005).
Also, public policies regarding different food safety 
issues are interlinked. For example, in 2006 public 
control in Denmark discovered meat whose expira­
tion dates had long passed in some supermarkets.
7 The experiences with and opportunities for co­
regulation involving public and private sectors in the 
United Kingdom are investigated in Fearne and Martinez 
(2005).
This finding drew intensive media coverage. Imme­
diately after the "old-meat" case, there was political 
pressure on the minister of family and consumer 
affairs to control Salmonella in imported meats and 
eggs. Even though these policy issues are usually 
treated separately, the timing suggests that pres­
sure on the minister in the "old-meat" case led to 
increased pressure on the "Salmonella-import" 
issue. A related issue is that people are not con­
sumers all the time. Sociological studies distinguish 
between consumers and citizens, meaning that citi­
zens express only part of their preferences in their 
market behavior. Market behavior will not neces­
sarily capture general opinions, political beliefs, and 
voting behavior.
Producers and processors can affect the level of 
food safety through their choice of production 
system [via decisions they make about outdoor 
access for animals, hygiene, fodder, and pesticide 
use in vegetables, fruits, and other crops). Typi­
cally, enhanced food safety increases production 
costs. So it is not in producers' or processors' 
interest to increase food safety unless they can 
obtain a subsidy or a price premium or secure 
market shares—or unless they are forced to do it 
by public regulation. Therefore control is neces­
sary. Retailers might care about food safety to the 
extent that [1) they want to avoid outbreaks and 
recalls that give them bad publicity, [2) they have 
to comply with public regulation, and [3) they can 
meet the criteria of domestic and foreign con­
sumers that demand safer food.
Denmark exports 90 percent of its pork produc­
tion, two-thirds of its beef production, and around 
half of its poultry and egg production. Therefore, 
the perception of food safety in export markets is 
important to Danish producers. If food safety is 
not considered important or it is impossible to dis­
tinguish Danish food products from products from 
other countries, then Danish producers have little 
interest in financing a reduction in Salmonella 
prevalence. If, on the other hand, food safety is 
important to retailers and consumers abroad—or if 
it is a prerequisite for selling in these markets— 
then domestic producers have a strong incentive to 
control Salmonella.
The retailers' objective is to maximize profits. They 
care about food safety to the extent that con­
sumers do. With respect to Salmonella, experience 
shows that this objective implies that some retailers
have not been keen on labeling meat with place of 
origin even though this information is important 
from a food safety angle.
From an economic point of view, politicians have 
an interest in food safety insofar as it affects social 
welfare. Because food safety is subject to informa­
tionally imperfect markets and creates externalities 
with public health costs, authorities have a direct 
interest in regulating markets for food safety by 
formulating a food safety policy. The interests of 
public authorities should in principle represent 
consumers and producers, but politicians might 
also have their own agenda—which might be re- 
election.
The European Commission has an interest in opti­
mizing the overall level of food safety in the 
European Union, and since member countries have 
different preferences and production systems, their 
interests are not necessarily identical to Danish 
interests. Food safety is just one of many issues in 
which the European Commission must formulate a 
common policy. Hence, each country must accept 
that compromises are being made between their 
wishes and other countries' wishes and that food 
safety is being balanced against other issues.
Different countries around the world may have 
different and contradicting objectives. Whereas 
provision of sufficient volumes of food [food secu­
rity] may be the main objective in poor countries, 
this is not an issue in the rich countries. At the 
same time, in a globalized world, developing 
countries have an at least implicit interest in the 
food safety policies of rich countries because these 
policies may affect their trading opportunities.
Policy Options
What are the policy options for Danish politicians if 
they wish to reduce the prevalence of foodborne 
bacteria in Denmark? The Danish Veterinary and 
Food Administration has analyzed Denmark's pos­
sibilities for implementing a strategy to reduce the 
prevalence of foodborne bacteria in the Danish 
markets for meats and eggs [Danish Veterinary and 
Food Administration 2006], The report was pre­
pared by a working group initiated by the Danish 
minister of family and consumer affairs. As a result 
of the working group's recommendations, Denmark 
has applied for special status in the EU [like Finland
and Sweden] allowing it to adopt a zero-tolerance 
policy toward Salmonella in poultry and eggs. 
Owing to a higher prevalence of Salmonella in 
domestically produced pork and beef, Denmark 
decided to aim to reduce the Salmonella level in 
these types of meat before applying for special EU 
status with respect to pork and beef. The working 
group also concluded the following:
•  It is not possible to reject imported meat 
that is infected with bacteria [except with 
the multiresistant Salmonella MRDT104] by 
referring to either the EU environmental 
guarantee or the SPS Agreement.
•  It is possible to reject specific consign­
ments of meat that have been tested and 
are judged to be dangerous to human 
health using case-by-case control by refer­
ring to the EU legislation that food must 
not be sold if it is dangerous. The National 
Food Institute performs a risk assessment 
based on the test results. If the relative 
risk is too big, the consignment of meat 
must be withdrawn from the market and 
can be sent back. Similar control of Danish 
meat must be performed.
Based on these conclusions, Denmark initiated case- 
by-case control of bacteria starting in November 
2006. The Danish minister of family and consumer 
affairs warned that using the European legislation 
this way is new and that the procedures will be 
complicated. The idea is that the increased risk of 
having meat rejected in Denmark will induce Danish 
importers and foreign producers to reduce the 
prevalence of foodborne bacteria in their products. 
Under this system, meat infected at a level consid­
ered dangerous is restricted from the market. If 
not already sold at retail, the meat is submitted to 
heat treatment or sent back to the country of 
origin. The control has a risk-based sampling 
scheme, and the plan is to test 1,500 batches of 
imported meat and 900 batches of Danish- 
produced meat a year. Danish importers claim that 
the control discriminates against foreign meat by 
testing it more frequently than Danish-produced 
meat, and a local organization of importers is con­
sidering making a complaint to the European 
Commission. After one month under this system, 
Denmark had rejected one consignment of fresh 
meat. All 12 samples taken from 268-kilogram 
consignment of French chicken contained
Campylobacter at a level estimated to be 15 times 
above the average risk level at the same time the 
previous year.
This strategy is not the only option for Danish 
politicians to reduce the Salmonella risk for Danish 
consumers. Other options include:
•  working for common international rules 
regarding foodborne bacteria in food 
products, such as through EU legislation 
or WTO negotiations;
•  reducing Salmonella in Danish meats and 
eggs by eliminating Salmonella during pri­
mary production or processing;
•  pursuing decontamination strategies 
instead of prevention strategies using a 
new EU directive that allows decontamina­
tion when scientific evidence for effective­
ness and cost savings can be documented 
(this directive is not in use yet];
•  adopting market interventions like subsi­
dizing production of safe food, taxing 
unsafe food, or implementing labeling 
standards;
•  informing and educating consumers about 
food safety and hygiene requirements 
when preparing fresh meat products and 
eggs; and
•  pursuing increased use of co-regulation 
through coordination of public and private 
efforts.
Assignment
Your assignment is to identify opportunities and 
obstacles for improving Danish food safety policy 
using Salmonella control as a case. Discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of the options men­
tioned in this case study for each stakeholder 
group. The assignment should include a discussion 
of the consequences of increased food safety in 
rich countries for the trading opportunities of 
developing countries. For example, is there neces­
sarily a trade-off between the best possible food 
safety in Denmark and the welfare of people in 
developing countries that wish to export food 
products to Denmark?
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